Enhancing rural leadership and institutions by Stephen Cornell
M
y assigned topic in this paper is leader-
ship and institutions and how we might
improve both in rural America. How-
ever, a felt obligation to be fair to the reader (or lis-
tener) compels me to begin with a disclaimer. I like
to think that I know something about institutions;
I may know something about leadership, which is
the trickier topic. But I cannot claim to know a great
deal about rural America. Or perhaps I should say:
I cannot claim to know a great deal about the parts
of rural America that are probably of most concern
to the participants in this conference.
Let me explain. Like many of those participants,
I have spent much of my professional life studying
economic development in rural parts of the United
States. But unlike most of them—at least so I imag-
ine—I have spent virtually all of that time looking
at a distinctive set of cases: American Indian
nations. The question that has organized much of
my research energy and consulting work over the
last ten to 15 years has been a rather simple but spe-
cialized one: why are some American Indian nations
better at economic development than others? It is a
straightforward question that has turned out to have
some interestingly complex answers. 
You may wonder, however, just what relevance
Indian reservation economic development has for
rural economic development more generally. After
all, the focus of this conference is not Indian coun-
try, except to the extent that most of Indian coun-
try is both rural and poor. In fact, to some people,
Indian reservations seem as if they are not really part
of rural America at all but constitute another coun-
try altogether. I expect that a fair number of people
think that much of what applies in the rest of rural
America probably doesn’t apply on American
Indian reservations, and vice versa. What might a
student of reservation economic development have
to offer at a conference such as this?
If that’s what you’re thinking, you’ve echoed cer-
tain of my own thoughts, some months ago, when
Larry Meeker of the Federal Reserve Bank in Kansas
City ﬁrst asked me to write this paper. Indeed, that’s
basically what I said to Larry: what do I know about
economic development in rural America? I study
development on Indian reservations, including
some that aren’t even rural.
It took Larry a couple of tries to persuade me that
there might be lessons in what I and my colleagues
have learned about economic development on
American Indian reservations, lessons that might be
helpful in other, non-Indian, development situa-
tions. But Larry has read the work we’ve done; he
thinks about these things a lot; and if he was con-
vinced, then I had to ﬁgure there might be some-
thing to it. So here I am. But there’s a buyer beware
clause in here: if I have any demonstrated expertise,
it is not on rural development per se but on Indian
reservation development. I’ve come around to
Larry’s viewpoint, but you will have to be the judges
of whether or not I’m right. What I can do in this
paper is tell you what I and my colleagues in this
Enhancing Rural Leadership and Institutions
Stephen Cornell
The author would like to thank Johnnie Jacobs, Miriam Jorgensen,
Joseph Kalt, Larry Meeker, and Rachel Yaseen for their contribu-
tions to the discussion presented in this paper. 
Cornell.qxd  11/24/00  12:53 PM  Page 103104 Stephen Cornell
work have seen and learned and identify the more
general signiﬁcance that—in my naiveté—I think I
can draw from our work. But ultimately, I do not
know enough to tell just where you might ﬁnd help-
ful resonances or “aha!” moments. You’ll have to
decide that for yourselves.
In what follows I’m going to do several things.
First, I want to explore rather brieﬂy the general top-
ics of leadership and institutions and the role they
play in economic development. Second, I am going
to examine some of the most remarkable develop-
ment stories currently being put together in rural
America—or anywhere else, for that matter—sto-
ries that are transforming some of the poorest com-
munities in the country into, if not economic
powerhouses, at least viable, economically produc-
tive, hopeful places. And third, I am going to try to
mine those stories for lessons about leadership and
institutions that may be helpful to the development
effort in other parts of the rural United States. 
One thing I cannot do, however, here or anywhere
else: evaluate the current state of leadership and
institutions in rural America. This is simply beyond
both my expertise and my research resources. 
LEADERSHIP AND INSTITUTIONS
IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Leadership gets a lot of attention in discussions of
economic development, at least in Indian country.
It is not uncommon to hear a tribal member, frus-
trated by the repeated banging of the head against
the wall that constitutes so much of the develop-
ment experience on some reservations, exclaim that
“what we need is a real good leader!” or words to
that effect. 
This is understandable. The history of many
Indian nations often is communicated as a history
of leadership; ﬁgures such as Sitting Bull, Crazy
Horse, Cochise, and numerous others loom large in
the history of the ﬁrst peoples of this land and typi-
cally are credited with nation-shaping or nation-
saving deeds. It is hardly surprising that often des-
perately poor Indian nations might look to some as-
yet-unidentiﬁed leaders to come up with the answers
they have sought for so long. But the concern with
leadership ﬁts mainstream American culture as well,
with its individualist ethos and its colloquial “great
man” interpretations of history. We’re good at cele-
brating leadership, better yet at criticizing it, and
often in search of it, and the rural development arena
is no exception. Numerous commentaries and stud-
ies treat leadership as a critical element in the devel-
opment puzzle, and are concerned about where
leadership will come from (Shively 1997), whether
it will be up to the challenge (Chiras and Herman
1997), or how to prepare it for the tasks at hand
(Murray and Dunn 1996). 
Unfortunately, we are not as good at saying just
what leadership is or what it does. As Ronald
Hustedde pointed out nearly a decade ago in a dis-
cussion of leadership and rural development, it is
difﬁcult enough to deﬁne leadership, “and even
more difﬁcult to practice it or teach it” (1991,
p. 111). One of the things I hope to explore in this
paper is what leadership concretely contributes to
economic development. 
Institutions are easier to think about because so
much thinking has already been done. While there
are plenty of big questions that remain to be
answered about institutions, it is now well estab-
lished that they are a critical, determining factor in
the economic fortunes of human societies. From
studies of both historical and contemporary eco-
nomic growth across nations (Barro 1991; Egnal
1996; Knack and Keefer 1995; North 1990) to
studies of international investment (La Porta et al.
1997, 1998), from studies of how communities can
successfully manage common-property irrigation
systems (Ostrom 1992) to the study of Chinese col-
lective agriculture (Oberschall 1990), there has
been a convergence in much of social science
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tive rules societies put in place to organize individ-
ual and collective behavior—determine much of
the ability of human societies at all levels to act effec-
tively in pursuit of their purposes, including eco-
nomic purposes (DiMaggio and Powell 1991).
They matter through their relative capacity or inca-
pacity for organizing cooperation, resolving
conﬂicts, guiding action into productive channels,
reducing free-riding by societal members and, more
generally, getting things done.
Institutions have received a good deal of attention
in the rural development literature in the United
States as well, although at times the concern appears
to be largely with the organization of development
efforts—for example, with intergovernmental rela-
tionships, changing power distributions between
national and local levels of government, or policy
concentrations on certain sectors such as agriculture
(Galston and Baehler 1995; Radin et al. 1996; Mur-
ray and Dunn 1996)—paying relatively little atten-
tion to the issue of how institutional structures shape
behavior, including the behavior of investors. Part of
my purpose in this paper is to point to some of the
other institutional issues that rural developers face.
But ﬁrst: the Indian case.
THE INDIAN RESERVATION
DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT
Let’s look for a minute at Indian country, a term
of convenience that—if we depart slightly from its
precise legal meaning—can be used to embrace
both Indian reservations and other predominantly
indigenous communities, such as Alaska Native vil-
lages, in the United States.1 First of all, it is hugely
diverse. Just as the term “rural America” suggests a
largely ﬁctional commonality among rural places,
so the term “Indian country” suggests a consistency
among Indian places that is only partially the case.
The full set of Indian reservations ranges from the
Gila River Indian Community on the outskirts of
Phoenix to the Pine Ridge Sioux Reservation in a
rural region of South Dakota. Indian country
includes tiny California rancherias with popula-
tions of under 100 and the Navajo Reservation with
a population of close to 200,000. Natural resource
endowments, social conditions, demographics, and
cultural practices all vary enormously across Indian
country. One of the important things these diverse
places have in common, however, is a distinctive
relationship with the federal government and with
the United States that both constrains them—
sometimes severely—in ways other communities in
the country do not experience and, on occasion,
offers them opportunities that other communities
do not have.
The vast majority of them also share both a 20th
century history and a 21st century present of
poverty. We all know that, in recent decades, rural
America as a whole has tended to lag behind the rest
of the country economically, with generally higher
rates of unemployment, lower wages, lower house-
hold income, and higher rates of poverty (Agricul-
ture Fact Book 98; Murray and Dunn 1996; Radin
et al.1996). As we also know, this aggregate picture
hides massive variation, from bright spots where
economic development is vigorous and appears sus-
tainable to areas where little is happening econom-
ically and little seems likely to happen any time soon
(Fitchin 1991).
Most Indian reservations are part of rural Amer-
ica and ﬁt this overall picture. They, too, lag behind
the rest of the country on major economic indica-
tors, and they, too, are various. But the degree to
which they lag behind the rest of the country is dra-
matic: the aggregate pattern is far worse than it is
for rural America as a whole. 
By way of illustration: For administrative pur-
poses, the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
divides the United States into a number of “admin-
istrative areas.” Table 1 shows aggregate unemploy-
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ment ﬁgures by Bureau of Indian Affairs adminis-
trative areas in 1997, the most recent year for which
I have such data. These ﬁgures are for BIA service
populations, which include persons resident “on or
near” reservations who are eligible to use that par-
ticular tribe’s BIA-funded services. In other words,
these ﬁgures include most of the tribal membership
that is resident on or near those reservations that fall
within each area.
Clearly the overall picture is grim. In the
Aberdeen and Billings areas, more than two-thirds
Table 1
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES BY BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS (BIA) AREA,
1997













Note: BIA labor force and unemployment estimates are given by reservation and aggregated by administrative area. Figures are
self-reported by tribes and, given tribes’ variable resources and capacities to gather such data and the inherent difﬁculty of
gathering labor force data in large rural areas, are difﬁcult to evaluate and should be used with caution. They nonetheless are
useful indicators of the general state of reservation economies.
Source: Bureau of Indian Affairs 1997.
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even in the area with the lowest aggregate unem-
ployment—Albuquerque—the percentage is still
approaching one third. There is no reason to believe
that in the last couple of years these numbers have
signiﬁcantly changed. 
This is only one indicator; we could review oth-
ers. For present purposes, sufﬁce it to say that the
unemployment indicator is hardly anomalous:
taken as a whole, Indian reservations are much
poorer not only than metropolitan America but
than the rest of rural America as well. And they not
only show high indicators of poverty; they also show
high indices of many of the social problems that we
normally associate with entrenched poverty: ill
health, poor housing, crime, domestic violence, sui-
cide, and so forth. 
But the other characteristic of rural America that
I’ve already noted is also true of Indian country:
there is massive variation from the mean. On the
one hand, there are some reservations with aston-
ishingly high unemployment rates. For example, in
1997 unemployment at the Cheyenne River Sioux
Reservation in the Dakotas was reported at 80 per-
cent, 77 percent at Rocky Boy’s in Montana, 62 per-
cent at Red Lake Chippewa. On the other hand, the
Jicarilla Apaches in New Mexico reported 15 per-
cent unemployment, Cochiti Pueblo reported
7 percent, and the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa
and Chippewa Indians in Michigan reported no
unemployment at all in its labor force of 2,200 peo-
ple (Bureau of Indian Affairs 1997). 
This variation is apparent not only in static, snap-
shot form but also longitudinally. Consider the
1980s. This is an interesting period to consider
because it was a time when rural America in general
was not doing well. The burst of rural population
growth in the 1970s had run its course, returning
rural America to the preceding, extended pattern of
population loss, while rural poverty rates, after drop-
ping through much of the 1970s, increased in the fol-
lowing decade (Rural Sociological Society 1993).2
It was a tough decade for Indian country as well, with
the percentage of all reservation Indian adults with
incomes in excess of the poverty rate falling, if not by
much. But the variation was substantial. Table 2
shows changes in the percentage of adults with
incomes in excess of BIA-determined poverty levels
in the period from 1977 to 1989 for ten Indian reser-
vations, chosen to illustrate the range.
The overall picture, then, conveys a compelling
message: Indian country is poor, and often desper-
ately so. But the variation within that picture like-
wise conveys a message: It is not uniformly poor,
and the range of variation is high. To the social sci-
entist, here is where the interest lies. The variation
suggests that there’s a story here, and perhaps an
instructive one.
Some Stories
In fact, there is more than a single story here; there
is a set of stories. Here are a few of them.
The Citizen Potawatomi Nation of Oklahoma is
one of the striking success stories in Indian country
today. In the mid-1970s, according to its current
chairman, John Barrett, this tribe had $550 in the
bank, high unemployment among tribal members,
and no recent history of successful economic devel-
opment. Twenty-ﬁve years later, as we enter the 21st
century, the tribe owns the First National Bank of
Shawnee, Oklahoma, as well as a number of retail
and media enterprises in the region. It is a major
regional employer that provides jobs not only for its
own membership but for nonmembers as well. The
most recent data I have, for 1997, show an unem-
ployment rate of 10 percent—high enough, but
dramatically lower than the average for Indian reser-
vations. In 1997, only 16 percent of tribal members
holding Potawatomi jobs were employed in the gov-
ernment sector (Bureau of Indian Affairs 1997).
This is one of the lowest ﬁgures in the country for
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Indian reservations, suggesting signiﬁcant produc-
tive economic activity. By Barrett’s account, the
tribe has moved from pariah status (“lazy Indians”)
to a position of recognized political and social power
in the region. 
In the 1960s, the Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians—located in a poor region of eastern Mis-
sissippi and lacking signiﬁcant natural resources or
market access—was mired in poverty. Unemploy-
ment was close to 30 percent and less than half of
Choctaw families were earning at least $1,000 a
year. A third of adult Choctaws had no formal edu-
cation; fewer than 10 percent had ﬁnished high
school. The better educated members—particularly
men—were steadily leaving the reservation for bet-
ter economic opportunities elsewhere (Ferrara
1998). Today, the tribe has created more than 6,000
on-reservation jobs. Only a quarter of them are in
tribal government; the rest are in productive enter-
Table 2
CHANGES IN POVERTY LEVELS ON SELECTED AMERICAN INDIAN
RESERVATIONS, 1977-89
Reservation Percent change in income, 1977-89
Flathead (MT) 16
Ft. Apache (AZ) 12
Cochiti Pueblo (NM) 10
Mescalero (NM) 9
Muckleshoot (WA) 6
Pine Ridge (SD) -1
San Carlos (AZ) -7
Rosebud (SD) -10
Yakama (WA) -12
Northern Cheyenne (MT) -15
All reservations -1
Note: Change in income refers to the change in the percentage of adults with incomes in excess of BIA-determined poverty
levels ($5,000 in 1977; $7,000 in 1989).
Source: Bureau of Indian Affairs 1989.
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Choctaws have become the largest employer in east
central Mississippi and one of the ten largest in the
state. Every day, thousands of Mississippians—
black and white—drive onto the Choctaw reserva-
tion to take jobs in Choctaw-owned and -operated
businesses. Over the last decade, incomes in the
Choctaw region of Mississippi have been rising
faster than the state average, and unemployment has
fallen to just over half the state average, thanks in
large measure to Choctaw-led economic develop-
ment. Importantly, the tribe has put together this
impressive development record while maintaining a
high degree of Choctaw language retention, even
among young tribal members, and a continuing
engagement with traditional cultural practices (Fer-
rara 1998; NCAI 1998, p. 8; U.S. Bureau of the
Census 1993).
During the 1980s, as reservation economic con-
ditions in general were deteriorating across Indian
country, the White Mountain Apache Tribe in Ari-
zona was a successful operator of nine tribally
owned enterprises, including a ski resort, a trophy
elk hunt, an aerospace manufacturing enterprise,
and a major forest and sawmill operation. Their
timber enterprise was among the most productive
in the western United States, regularly outperform-
ing Weyerhaeuser and other private operators, and
they were managing their huge ponderosa pine for-
est for sustained multiple use. The tribe had become
one of the economic anchors of east central Arizona.
Its ski resort was ﬁlling motels in non-Indian towns
during the previously slow winter months, and local
chambers of commerce, when considering the eco-
nomic future of the region, were looking to the
Apaches as critical partners in planning and devel-
opment. This is a striking turnaround in Indian-
white relations in that part of Arizona, known for
its history of violent conﬂict.3
These stories are striking, but they are by no
means the only ones of their kind in Indian coun-
try. A signiﬁcant number of tribes have broken away
from the long-standing pattern of reservation
poverty, building productive and sustainable
economies in the process. This phenomenon
became especially notable in the 1980s, a decade in
which federal support for Indian country was
declining and unemployment among all reservation
Indians rose (Bureau of Indian Affairs 1989).
Among others, the Confederated Salish and Koote-
nai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation in Montana,
the Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reser-
vation in Oregon, the Muckleshoots in Washing-
ton, and both Cochiti Pueblo and the Mescalero
Apaches in New Mexico showed signiﬁcant eco-
nomic improvements during that decade (Cornell
and Kalt 1992, p. 4). Only in the Muckleshoot case
was gaming a major factor in economic growth in
this period. And the trend has continued. In the
1990s, tribes such as the Grand Traverse Band of
Ottawa and Chippewa Indians in Michigan, the
Eastern Cherokees in North Carolina, the Gila
River Indian Community in Arizona, and others
have stepped aboard the development train. 
To be sure, these stories do not constitute a major-
ity of Indian nations—not by a long shot—but there
are enough of them for us to talk seriously about a
major change under way in Indian country: a
signiﬁcant group of Indian nations has broken away
from the prevailing pattern of relentless poverty and
hopelessness and is writing a new, dramatic, and
hopeful chapter in rural economic development.
How might we account for these exceptions to the
overall pattern?
A RESEARCH ENTERPRISE
A dozen years ago, an economist named Joseph
Kalt and I decided to try to ﬁnd out. We were at
Harvard University, where Joe still teaches, and we
shared some interests in the political economy of
Indian country. We were aware that something was
afoot out there: things were changing. Some of the
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stories I’ve just related hadn’t been written yet—
they were under way—but there was growing evi-
dence of this breakaway pattern. We wanted to ﬁnd
out what was going on. How could we account for
it? Why were some Indian nations “better,” so to
speak, at economic development than others were,
and were the differences transferable?
This was an interesting question for obvious rea-
sons but in part because some of our top-of-the-
head answers didn’t seem to ﬁt the economic
development evidence. In the 1980s a lot of com-
mon development wisdom assumed that those
nations with good natural resources or good market
access would be successful developers. But the Mis-
sissippi Choctaws, with very little in the way of nat-
ural resources and poor market access, were putting
on a scintillating development performance, while
the Crow Tribe of Montana, with perhaps the most
lavish set of natural resources of any tribe in the
country and crossed by a major interstate highway,
was locked in the development doldrums.
Another assumption was that better education
would lead to better development. But some of the
most impressive development stories from the
1980s were being written by tribes with educational
achievement below the reservation mean, including
the White Mountain Apache Tribe in Arizona and
the Mississippi Choctaws. 
Another idea was that access to ﬁnancial capital
was a key element in getting development under
way. But the tribes we were looking at seemed to say
something else: what was important about them
was that they appeared to be capable of attracting
capital, not that they started out with it. Capital was
clearly important, but something else preceded cap-
ital availability and facilitated access to dollars.
Other tribes had difﬁculty persuading investors to
invest, but these had solved the problem.
So we were intrigued. We started a research enter-
prise called the Harvard Project on American Indian
Economic Development to see if we could ﬁnd some
answers. We used three research strategies: (1) sys-
tematic comparison of economic development poli-
cies and outcomes in a ﬁeld sample of a dozen or so
Indian nations, (2) statistical analysis of such data as
we could assemble on the 70 largest tribes in the
country, and (3) pro bono consulting projects carried
out by graduate students on tribe-speciﬁc policy
issues identiﬁed as critical by various Indian nations. 
FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS
A number of results have emerged from this
research.4 The following summary is not intended
as comprehensive, although it includes much of
what we’ve learned. Its purpose instead is to organ-
ize our ﬁndings in terms that seem applicable to
other rural development situations. Some may
conﬁrm things that are strongly suspected—per-
haps even well established—for rural America.
Some may be new. But these are the ones that strike
me, with limited knowledge beyond the Indian
case, as helpful.
(1) Local control matters
In the Indian case, the issue is sovereignty: the
right of Indian nations to control their own strate-
gic decisions, resources, internal affairs, relation-
ships with other sovereigns, and so forth—in short,
to govern themselves. This is a matter, at one and
the same time, of law (the legal right to self-rule),
of policy (active federal support of that right), and
of practice (tribal assertions of self-rule). After a
dozen years of work on this topic, Harvard project
researchers have been unable to ﬁnd a single case of
an Indian nation demonstrating sustained, positive
economic performance in which somebody other
than the Indian nation itself is making the major
decisions about resource allocations, development
strategy, and related matters.
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above. For example, the economic turnaround for
the White Mountain Apache Tribe began when the
tribe put itself in the driver’s seat in reservation
affairs. After years of federal control of tribal deci-
sion making, in the 1960s the Apaches moved
aggressively to shift the federal government from a
decision-making role to a resource role. As the tribe
began to make its own decisions, assemble strategic
plans that reﬂected its own priorities, and take
responsibility for its own actions, its economic per-
formance began—and continued—to improve. 
In the case of rural economic development more
generally, the issue is devolution: shifting decision-
making power downward in the governance struc-
ture from federal and even state levels to regional
and local levels. This is a major theme of the Inte-
grated Rural Development and “new governance”
paradigms (Murray and Dunn 1996; Radin et al.
1996), and it ﬁnds strong support from the Indian
experience. The research evidence from Indian
country, in fact, is unequivocal: the chances of sus-
tained economic development decline rapidly the
further decision-making moves from the commu-
nity whose future is at stake.
The reasons for the importance of local control
are several, not least the fact that local decision mak-
ing puts the development agenda in local hands.
David Lester, Executive Director of the Council of
Energy Resource Tribes, once said that “economic
development is about becoming what you want to
be.”5The corollary is that it is not about becoming
what others want you to be. If so, then control over
the development agenda is a crucial element in suc-
cessful economic development. 
But perhaps the most important reason for local
control is simply the link between decisions and their
consequences. Outsiders seldom bear the conse-
quences of their decisions about the economic future
of a community, and consequently there is little in
the way of a dependable—i.e., disciplined—learning
curve producing better decisions over time. When
decisions move into the hands of those whose future
is at stake, the decision makers themselves begin to
bear the consequences of their decisions, reaping the
rewards of good decisions and paying the price of bad
ones. The result is that, over time, the quality of the
decisions improves.6  This certainly has been the
experience in Native America; there is little reason to
believe it would not be the same elsewhere.7
The local control ﬁnding has implications of its
own, likewise supported by Indian country evi-
dence. It is the reason why, other things equal, block
grants make more sense than project funding; why
the appropriate role for federal agencies in local
development is not a decision-making role but a
resource one; and why local-level capacity building
is so important. 
(2) Institutions matter
Devolving decision-making power to local com-
munities has another implication, one that emerges
clearly from the Indian development experience.
Decision-making power that is not backed up by
effective institutions of governance is unlikely to
lead to sustained economic development. In other
words, institutions matter, and in Indian country,
they matter a great deal. The second ﬁnding that has
emerged from this research is that sovereignty—
local control—that is not backed up with effective
institutions of governance is unlikely to yield sus-
tainable economic development.
This is evident in the cases I’ve already discussed.
John Barrett, chairman of the Citizen Potawatomi
Nation, claims that the key to economic transfor-
mation in the Potawatomi case was reform in tribal
governing institutions. Barrett tells how, in the
1970s, as a new member of the tribal council, he
tried to persuade non-Indian businesses to relocate
to poor Potawatomi communities. They were inter-
ested, he says, but they kept asking difﬁcult ques-
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tions. Do you have a legal code? Do you have a tribal
court? What happens if I have a dispute with the
tribe over how I do business? Will I be treated fairly
in that court? What happens to my relationship with
the tribe when there’s a change in tribal administra-
tions? Will my investment be secure? And so forth.
Barrett returned to the tribal council with sobering
news: we have got to reform our institutions if we’re
going to attract investment. It took a while, but even-
tually the tribe put in place the kinds of institutions
that communicated to investors that the Citizen
Potawatomi Nation was a safe and attractive place to
invest. The result has been a transformation in tribal
economic and social fortunes. More than 20 years
after those early efforts, Barrett is crystal clear on
what the lesson is: “If you’re not talking about con-
stitutional reform,” he says, “you’re not in the eco-
nomic development ballgame.”8
A number of factors joined together to produce
the Mississippi Choctaw success story, among them
skilled, assertive, and creative leadership; smart
recruitment of potential investors; the tribe’s vigor-
ous and long-term focus on education, including
tribal takeover of numerous educational services,
leading to a much more educated and skilled labor
force; and an insistence on tribal determination of
strategic priorities and tribal control of reservation
affairs. Also involved: political reorganization. The
tribe undertook constitutional reform in the 1970s,
leading to separations of powers, and made a major
effort to professionalize and streamline the tribal
bureaucracy. In essence, the Choctaws made them-
selves the most attractive place to invest in the
region, with the result that not only have joint ven-
ture partners and other investors brought money
and jobs onto the reservation, but tribal members
are returning to the reservation in signiﬁcant num-
bers (Ferrara 1998, p. 83).
“Institutions,” writes Douglass North, who has
contributed a great deal to our thinking on the
topic, “are the rules of the game in a society or, more
formally, are the humanly devised constraints that
shape human interaction” (1990, p. 3). Effective
institutions reduce uncertainty and bring stability
into human relationships. Whether it’s a commer-
cial code, an independent court system, a reliable
structure of governmental decision making, or a
dependable system for implementing the decisions
government makes, institutions make sustained,
productive economic activity possible.
Our research suggests that, in Indian country at
least, the institutional foundation of successful eco-
nomic development is characterized by at least four
elements. The ﬁrst is stability in the rules themselves
so that potential investors know the rules of the game
won’t change with changing administrations or local
conditions. The second is depoliticizing day-to-day
business decisions. Restricting political decision mak-
ing to strategic issues while putting day-to-day busi-
ness decisions in the hands of professionals separates
constituent service to voters from ﬁduciary service to
shareholders, thus increasing the chances of
proﬁtability (Jorgensen and Taylor 2000). In Indian
country, at least, tribally owned and operated enter-
prises that are buffered from political interference by
elected leaders are four times as likely to be proﬁtable
as those that aren’t (Cornell and Kalt 1992). The third
is depoliticizing dispute resolution. Indian nations that
are able to establish genuinely independent, strong
courts or other dispute resolution mechanisms do
signiﬁcantly better, other things equal, than those
that have no such mechanisms. Our evidence shows
that the depoliticization of dispute resolution has
bottom-line effects on reservation unemployment
(Cornell and Kalt 1992). The fourth element is
bureaucratic structures and procedures that can get
things done predictably and reliably.
Why are institutions so important? Institutions
send a message to potential investors. If the message
is positive (stability, depoliticized business manage-
ment and dispute resolution, procedural reliability,
etc.), the chances of investment rise. If the message
is negative (the reverse of the above parenthetical),
the chances of investment fall. And I should empha-
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of the term “investors,” embracing not only those
with dollars but those with ideas, energy, time, or
any other resource that can be an asset to develop-
ment. Thus, local residents of only average means
are as much potential investors in the future of their
communities as anyone else is. Importantly, they are
likely to make investment decisions on much the
same basis as outsiders or as those with substantial
ﬁnancial means: where is my investment—of time,
energy, ideas, or money—likely to be most produc-
tive and secure? 
Institutions represent, in effect, a major part of the
community’s answer to that question, and therefore
are one of the central pivots on which development
turns. Furthermore, the signiﬁcance of effective local
institutions of governance rises dramatically as local
control rises. Devolution puts a premium on local
institutional efﬁcacy; without it, devolution simply
leads to increased uncertainty for investors, who are
asked to leave a realm of relative predictability
(national institutions) to work in the unknown.
(3) Strategic thinking matters
Indian country has seldom been characterized by
strategic thinking. There are good reasons for this.
If political and economic control lies largely in the
hands of outsiders, what’s the point of strategic
thinking? Without the resources and powers neces-
sary to implement a thought-through development
strategy, why spend the time coming up with one?
Another reason is the often desperate economic
and social conditions of many Indian reservations.
Such conditions place enormous pressures on
elected tribal leadership to “get something going.”
The “something” can be almost anything, as long as
it produces jobs. Faced with typically short terms of
ofﬁce, frequent political turnover, and an endless
stream of petitioners looking for relief, tribal lead-
ers tend to look for quick ﬁxes for development
problems. The development strategy, in effect,
becomes band-aids and ﬁreﬁghting. It pursues
whatever can be funded, typically via federal grants;
pays less attention to sustaining businesses than to
starting them; and puts a premium on hitting home
runs instead of building economies incrementally.
It also pays little attention to long-term goals, pri-
orities, or concerns.
The alternative is strategic thinking: a systematic
examination not only of assets and opportunities
but of priorities and concerns. What kind of soci-
ety do we hope to build? What do we want to
change? What do we want to preserve or protect?
What kinds of prices are we willing to pay for devel-
opment, and what kinds of prices are we unwilling
to pay? For example, many Indian nations vigor-
ously pursue development options but are wary of
those that might involve net losses in political sov-
ereignty. Their strategic thinking has to take that
into account. Others are concerned about environ-
mental impacts, about signiﬁcant increases in the
numbers of nonmembers present on the reserva-
tion, about levels of indebtedness, and other issues.
Unless such considerations are thought through,
decision making occurs in a strategic vacuum, sim-
ply reacting to the pressures of the moment, the
mood of the voters, the funding decisions made
thousands of miles away by people with divergent
interests and limited local knowledge. 
A strategic approach to development involves a
shift from reactive thinking to proactive thinking
(focusing not only on circumstances but also on
what we want to create); from short-term thinking
to long-term thinking (looking not for quick ﬁxes
but for strategic development trajectories); from
opportunistic thinking toward systemic thinking
(asking not what can be funded but what ﬁts our
conception of our community); from a narrow
problem focus to a broader societal focus (thinking
not simply in terms of jobs and income but of the
development of the community as a whole). Obvi-
ously communities have to deal with the hard real-
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ities of opportunities and assets as well; not all
strategic visions can be achieved. But this is not
merely a visionary exercise, producing little more
than cerebral popcorn (tastes great during the meet-
ing but doesn’t last long). Instead, it produces a set
of concrete criteria by which development decisions
and choices among options can be made. 
Which is not to say that communities should not
be opportunistic—it’s to say that opportunism alone
is a limited strategy. The larger picture matters. For
example, the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and
Chippewa Indians in Michigan—one of the more
successful tribes in the country—took advantage of
the 1988 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act to open a
casino: certainly an opportunistic move. But what is
interesting about the tribe’s initiative is the strategic
context within which they consciously acted. When
I asked them in the early 1990s if they had an over-
all development strategy, their response was imme-
diate: to use gaming revenues to build an economy
that could survive the end of gaming revenues. This
was not all there was to it—the tribe also had a sense
of what kinds of economic activities it wanted to
enter and could realistically consider; a sense of pri-
orities regarding links between economic develop-
ment and other community issues; and a thoughtful
list of concerns that it needed to bear in mind as it
moved forward. The point is that its move into gam-
ing was neither conceived independently nor func-
tioned separately from a larger conception of what
the tribe was trying to do, how it wanted to go about
it, and where the potential dangers lay. In this case,
there was the potential federal prohibition of casino
gaming on the one hand, leading to a shutdown, and
the potential loosening of state-imposed gaming
constraints on the other, leading to increased com-
petition with non-Indian entities. The tribe’s devel-
opment thinking took both possibilities into
account, and planned accordingly.9 The fact that
the tribe went into gaming is unimportant to the
present discussion. The point is not to pursue any
particular strategy; it is to think strategically. 
(4) Leadership matters
In case after case across Indian country, we have
seen leadership playing a signiﬁcant role in economic
development, but that role is not everywhere the
same, and leadership sometimes looks very different
from one reservation to another. For example, the
western Apache peoples have a long tradition of
strong, charismatic leadership embodied in single
individuals. Their indigenous governing struc-
tures—the ways they governed themselves under
conditions of freedom—reﬂected that. They were rel-
atively simple structures that put a great deal of power
in the hands of single executives. The legislature or
council was relatively weak, and there was no provi-
sion for an independent judicial system; dispute res-
olution rested largely in the hands of the leader. 
The Lakota peoples of the northern Plains gov-
erned themselves very differently. They seldom con-
centrated power in the hands of a single person on
more than a temporary or task-speciﬁc basis. Their
executives served at the pleasure of a relatively pow-
erful council—it was in essence a parliamentary sys-
tem. There was a strong and politically independent
judicial and law enforcement arm in the akicita or
warrior societies, who were charged with making
sure that the executives observed the law along with
everyone else. 
Leadership in these cases looked very different.
The traditional Apache leader was something of an
autocrat, while the Lakota leader had to be a con-
sensus builder (Cornell and Kalt 1995). Leadership,
according to these examples at least, is not a one-
size-ﬁts-all proposition.
These traditions continue to ﬁnd support in
Apache and Lakota communities today. The
Apaches have a contemporary history of strong chief
executives who serve for long periods and exercise
enormous inﬂuence in reservation affairs. The
Lakota, on the other hand, have been stuck with a
set of contemporary governing institutions—
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signiﬁcant odds with indigenous ideas about how
authority ought to be organized and exercised. The
current system is a strong chief executive system with
weak legislative and judicial branches—nothing like
traditional Lakota government—and the survival of
Lakota tradition is apparent in its lack of legitimacy
among tribal members. They do not feel it is their
government, and it has difﬁculty mobilizing their
energies for development or very much else.
Part of the problem this points to is institutional
design: governing institutions need to have legiti-
macy if they are going to produce results. One way
to establish legitimacy is to pay attention in the
design of those institutions to what constituents
believe is appropriate. But the other part of it has to
do with leadership: leaders need legitimacy, too, or
they will ﬁnd themselves without any followers.
Over the last 50 years, almost no chief executive has
ever been re-elected on the Pine Ridge Sioux reser-
vation in South Dakota, home to the Oglala Lakota
people. On the White Mountain Apache Reserva-
tion in Arizona, one individual has served as tribal
chairman for more than 20 of the last 30 years. Insti-
tutions and leadership work arm in arm.
But what do legitimate and effective leaders actu-
ally do in the economic development puzzle? Our
evidence suggests several things.10
They are precipitators. Over and over again, in trac-
ing the history of the more economically successful
Indian nations, we have run into accounts of times
when some individual or small group of persons
said, in effect, “Enough! We’re not doing things this
way anymore!” This is what happened when the
White Mountain Apache Tribe forced the federal
government to relinquish the primary decision-
making role on their reservation. It is what hap-
pened when the Mississippi Choctaws turned their
attention to the reform of political institutions. And
it is happening more and more frequently around
Indian country today as a new generation of lead-
ers turns its attention to escaping dependency on
federal dollars and the constraints that dependency
always brings with it. 
In short, development frequently requires new
kinds of behavior and new kinds of actions. Break-
ing with past habits or established ways of doing
business often requires an innovator or a set of inno-
vators willing to stick their necks out and do things
differently. This is not intended to be a “great man”
theory of history, but merely to recognize that new
circumstances often demand new responses, and
somebody has to start.
They are interpreters. In the 1980s, as bingo began
to make its way into Indian country, the Mississippi
Choctaws decided not to participate. There was no
signiﬁcant history of games of chance in Choctaw
society and most Choctaws did not view gaming as
an appropriate economic development strategy.
Then, in 1988, Congress passed the Indian Gam-
ing Regulatory Act. Throughout Indian country,
gaming became not only a matter of economics but
a matter of politics: entering the gaming industry
became a demonstration of tribal sovereignty. Philip
Martin, Chairman of the Mississippi Choctaw
Tribe, presented it to his people in those terms and
the attitude toward gaming changed. Today the
Choctaw nation is a successful gaming tribe.
Leaders interpret circumstances, events, and
opportunities to their people. The interpretations
they make can have signiﬁcant impacts on what
communities are or are not willing to do.
They are conduits for information. When John Bar-
rett of the Citizen Potawatomi Tribe discovered that
investors wanted to see major institutional changes
before they would bet on the Potawatomi future, he
brought that information back to the nation. The
information constituted a new perspective on eco-
nomic development, one that put political institu-
tions at the heart of the development process. In
fact, Barrett was playing three leadership roles at
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once: bringing new and important information to
the tribe, interpreting rejection by investors not as
anti-Potawatomi but as anti-instability and risk,
and precipitating action by demanding change, by
making clear that the tribe could not continue to
act in the same old ways and expect to be econom-
ically successful.
They make themselves dispensable. We have worked
with one tribe that has a long tradition of strong
leaders and has been governed by one or two pow-
erful individuals for the last couple of decades.
Unfortunately, it also has a long history of under-
developed governing institutions. Given that fact,
the tribe has been lucky that the individuals who
have led it have tended to be honest and capable.
Eventually, however, the tribe chose a leader who
attempted to turn the ofﬁce to his own advantage.
The problem the tribe faced was twofold: it had set
up no institutional structures—rules, procedures,
a court capable of enforcing them—that could pro-
tect the tribe from corrupt or incompetent leader-
ship. And few other people had leadership
experience and could step into the breach.
The most effective leaders, over the long haul, are
those that (1) encourage leadership on the part of
others, and (2) build governing institutions that are
not themselves dependent on good leadership. In
doing these two things, they make themselves dis-
pensable, empower their communities, and make
successful development more likely.
CONCLUSION
In reviewing our ﬁndings from Indian country,
I have focused on four things: local control, effective
institutions, strategic thinking, and leadership. But in
fact, these are interrelated. Good governing institu-
tions, for example, make local control effective; with-
out them, it is toothless. And leadership is often what
it takes if a community is to move from band-aids and
ﬁreﬁghting to a strategic vision and plan of action.
How do you enhance both? As far as institutions
are concerned, I have tried to make clear at least
some of what distinguishes “good” or effective insti-
tutions from “bad” or ineffective ones. What we
need is models to work with: institutional structures
that work and clear indications of which ones work
best in what sorts of community circumstances.
This is in part a research task: we need systematic,
comparative analysis that explores the three-way ﬁt
between communities, institutional structures, and
circumstantial demands. 
Leadership, as always, is harder to get a grip on.
The fundamental task, I think, is educational. Lead-
ership may be difﬁcult to teach as an art, and it may
be dependent to some degree on intangible quali-
ties that some people have and some do not. But
surely it can be taught as understanding and tech-
nique. Those who understand the critical role of
institutions in economic development, for example,
are more likely to take the lead in creating and
defending them.
Having said all of this, however, I have to return
to the disclaimer with which I began: my limited
expertise prevents me from knowing just what, in
all of it, might be most useful to the participants in
this conference. Are our ﬁndings relevant? Or is the
Indian country context too distinctive to produce
transferable lessons? 
Certainly the differences are substantial. Some are
legal: Indian nations both enjoy a degree of sover-
eignty that not all other rural communities share and
suffer from a degree of external political control that
few other rural communities experience. Some are
strategic: In their development decisions, most
Indian nations attach a far higher degree of impor-
tance than other rural communities do to the main-
tenance and maximization of political autonomy and
the protection of long-standing cultural practices and
resources. Some are cultural: Language, kinship rela-
tions, some patterns of land use, collective identity,
and other cultural differences can complicate the
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embittering legacy of colonization, catastrophic vio-
lence, comprehensive land and resource loss, lethal
attacks on indigenous culture, and rampant federal
paternalism is itself a developmental obstacle that
Indian nations struggle daily to overcome.
But there are similarities as well. For the most
part, Indian nations in the United States are small,
rural communities. Many of them, like other rural
communities, have economic histories of massive,
externally controlled resource extraction. They, too,
have experienced signiﬁcant demographic losses in
the latter half of the 20th century, especially among
the talented young. Like others, they face the uncer-
tain impacts of a rapidly changing, global, techno-
logically sophisticated economy. And like other
parts of rural America, they are searching for the
secrets of a particular kind of success: How do you
create an increased measure of prosperity that does
not, in the process of its achievement, destroy what
you most value in your land, your community, and
your way of life? The fact that some of them seem
to have found those secrets is enough to suggest that
we pay attention to what they’ve done.
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1 In February 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that lands
held by Native entities under the terms of the Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) are not “Indian country.”
This in effect prevents Alaska tribes from exercising over
ANCSA lands certain powers commonly exercised on reserva-
tion lands by Indian nations in the lower 48 states. See Alaska
v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government, 118 S. Ct. 948
(1998). For discussion of the implications of this decision for
Native peoples in Alaska, see Kendall-Miller 1998. On the legal
meaning of the term “Indian country,” see Pevar 1992. 
2 The long-term trend, however, is unclear. As Nelson and
Beyers (1998) note, the ﬁrst half of the 1990s showed
signiﬁcant population growth in much of the rural West,
including some relatively remote regions, with income and
employment sometimes rising quite dramatically as well.
3 For some discussion of the White Mountain Apache case, see
Cornell and Kalt 1995.
4 Harvard Project research ﬁndings are reported in a number of
places; see especially Cornell and Kalt (1992, 1995, 1997,
1998, in press) and Cornell and Gil-Swedberg 1995. 
5 In his presentation at the Reservation Economic Summit
(RES/99), Phoenix, Arizona, March 9, 1999.
6 This is the familiar principal-agent phenomenon in political
economy. For discussion of the issue in one Indian develop-
ment sector, see Krepps and Caves 1994; more generally, see
Jensen and Meckling 1976.
7 Indeed, the Indian ﬁndings on local control—or what in the
Indian case amounts to self-rule—are hardly anomalous. For
interesting national-level examples from Eastern Europe, see
Rona-Tas 1998, and Stark 1996.
8 This story is drawn largely from John Barrett’s speech at the
conference on “Building American Indian Nations for the 21st
Century,” Tucson, Arizona, November 12, 1999. The quotation
is from my telephone conversation with Barrett, August 1999.
9This account draws on my ﬁeld notes from visits to the Grand
Traverse Band in the early 1990s and from subsequent conver-
sations with tribal leaders. 
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then we’ll take a break.
Joe Dudick, Rural Communities, Inc.: I have a
question really for the panel. That is, how do we
reestablish the ruling class, if you want to call it that,
when the factor that killed off the ruling class is
probably not going to change, and let me explain
what I mean by that. When I was a kid growing up
in a small rural community not too many years ago,
we had three locally owned banks. The men that
controlled the economic destiny lived in the com-
munity. We had a number of small, I’ll call them
“old economy” industries, manufacturing and that
sort of thing, locally owned that created good fam-
ily-sustaining jobs. This was before the age of the
big box stores, so Main Street was loaded with lots
of locally owned shops and businesses. These were
the people that served on the library board and the
school board that really set the agenda and had the
vision for that community. People traveled to
places, so they brought back ideas. They con-
tributed money to, and helped raise money for, all
of the things that were needed to keep that com-
munity viable. What’s happened over the past quar-
ter century across rural America, as a result of
economic consolidation and globalization, is that
those businesses, those banks, those stores, those
manufacturing plants have either gone out of busi-
ness because they couldn’t compete or they’ve been
bought up by somebody somewhere else, as was
mentioned here, so those decisions as to that entity
are now made by somebody in New York, or Zurich,
or God knows where, with no commitment to that
place. We’re not going to turn the tide back on con-
solidation of the economy and globalization. In that
regard, how can we reestablish that ruling class in
rural communities across rural America?
Mr. Meeker: I’ll let Steve respond to this and we’ll
have panel discussion later on.
Mr. Cornell: Well, it’s bad to argue by anecdote,
but as you were talking I was reminded of the story
of Solidarity, the union in Poland that eventually
ended in the collapse of the Communist Regime
there, and it was started by a shipworker who leapt
over the fence and yelled to the workers, “Let’s do
it differently!” His name was Lech Walenza.
For one thing, you mentioned where the ideas come
from and so forth. We’ve been hearing about telecom-
munications and the Internet and so forth. The ideas
are now available. We may not be fully wired in rural
America, but increasingly, there are no boundaries on
ideas. They’re available and what we simply need are
people who are willing to act on the basis of those
ideas. And I personally think that can come from any-
where. And certainly we’ve seen that in communities
where it’s not always who you might have expected
who eventually stand up and say, “Look, let’s do things
differently, and I’ll get a group of people together and
we’ll talk about it, and we’ll go talk to the other folks
and make this thing happen.” 
I think it’s less a ruling-class notion than simply
an idea of where do you find the innovators, and
most people have the capacity to innovate. It just
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Mr. Meeker: Thank you very much. I think it’s
been an outstanding panel. We will break now and
come back here sharp at 3:30 to conclude this panel
session for the afternoon.
122 Moderator: Larry Meeker
Cornell.qxd  11/24/00  12:54 PM  Page 122